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Toward Transparency and Broader Safeguards
Conclusion: A Closer Look at the Proposed
Saudi’s Civilian Nuclear Power Program
Thaqal Alhuzaymi, Ayodeji B. Alajo
Abstract—The higher the transparency of any civilian nuclear power program, the higher the chance of attracting and securing the longterm foreign nuclear cooperation. For newcomer states, securing nuclear cooperation is essential for successful deployment and
implementation of nuclear power program. Complying with an acceptable types of safeguards commitment/protocols plays a major role in
increasing transparency. The determination of transparency primarily relies on the presence of sensitive nuclear isotopes–as defined
under IAEA’s safeguards–with a nuclear facility. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is considering the deployment of civilian nuclear power
program with a projected nuclear capacity ~18 gigawatt-electric (GWe) by 2032-40. The goals of this paper were the quantification of the
sensitive nuclear isotopes (primarily plutonium) that will be produced within the prospective KSA nuclear facilities up to 2040 and the
estimation of the uranium fuel requirements. Two scenarios were analyzed. Scenario-I: two reactors are operational started by 2022 and
one reactors are added each year subsequently until the intended 11 reactors are deployed. Scenario-II is like Scenario-I, but only one
reactor is added each two years subsequent to the deployment of the first 2 reactors in 2022. Simulation of EPR operation was performed
from beginning of life to equilibrium cycle using Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP6) code. A 2-year cycle length was assumed.
The proposed KSA civilian nuclear power program would require 5766 and 4585 tonnes of cumulative uranium by 2040 for Scenario-I and
Scenario-II respectively. The discharged fuel (assuming full power at 90% capacity factor) would contain 17.6 and 13 tonnes of cumulative
239
Pu along with 21.4 and 15.9 tonnes of cumulative total plutonium by 2040 for Scenario-I and Scenario-II respectively. A primary concern
related to transparency is the ability and readiness of KSA to handle these quantities of special nuclear material under internationally
acceptable safeguards protocols as the planed nuclear power program expands. It’s recommended that KSA have AP in place well before
2040 to enable IAEA draw the broader safeguards conclusion which definitely will raise the confidence of the international community.

IJSER

Index Terms— Additional Protocol, Broader Safeguards Conclusion, Civilian Nuclear Energy Development, MCNP Simulation, Newcomer
States, Nuclear Transparency, Safeguards Commitiments.

——————————  ——————————
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1

INTRODUCTION

he latest reports by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) indicate an increase in demand for nuclear
power – a result of increasing electricity demand and
population growth [1]. Nuclear energy is considered by many
countries to be one of the safest energy sources that can produce a reasonable amount of electricity for a long period of
time. Rapid population growth, increased electricity demand
and limited energy resources are driving many developing
states (newcomers), including the Gulf States, to consider the
deployment of civilian nuclear power programs [2]. In 2010,
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) officially announced such
a deployment plan and established the King Abdullah City for
Atomic and Renewable Energy (KACARE) [3]. KACARE is
the KSA’s representative to the IAEA. The establishment is
also responsible for forming and deploying the KSA civilian
nuclear power program [3].
Since the Atoms for Peace speech in 1953, many lessons
have been learned in determining the essential factors for the
successful deployment of civilian nuclear power programs.
These factors include the ratification of the Nuclear Non————————————————
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Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the maintenance of a status of
compliance with the IAEA safeguard protocols [4]. The NPT
is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. It is important for newcomers to gain the confidence of
the international nuclear community and attract long-term
foreign nuclear cooperation. Thus, newcomer states must
have an acceptable safeguard protocols in place before the
deployment of their civilian nuclear power programs.
The IAEA safeguards system involves a set of obligations
and commitments: 1) the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), 2) the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) and 3) the
Additional Protocol (AP). After the discovery of the Iraqi
clandestine nuclear weapon program [5], the CSA was proven
to have limitations that prevented the IAEA from performing
its duties effectively and sufficiently [6]. Consequently, the
AP was adopted in 1997 to equip the IAEA with the needed
tools to verify, deter, and provide assurances of the absence of
undeclared nuclear activities [6], [7], [8]. The AP aims to
strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the
safeguards system [6], [7], [8]. Moreover, the AP enables the
IAEA to draw the broader safeguards conclusion [6], thereby
raising nuclear transparency at the state level.
The deployment of a civilian nuclear power program
comes with the need for a high level of nuclear transparency.
Jeemin Ha et al. (2014) defined nuclear transparency as referring to various forms of openness that enhance international

IJSER © 2016
http://www.ijser.org

37

International Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research, Volume 7, Issue 12, December-2016
ISSN 2229-5518

confidence and understanding in nuclear matters regarding a
country [9]. Another definition of nuclear transparency also
refers to openness [10] – which plays a major role in increasing
state-level nuclear transparency. Such openness requires
compliance with acceptable safeguard commitments that allows the IAEA to provide assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in state.

currently has no nuclear fuel cycle capabilities [3]. If the plans
of KACARE are followed precisely, the initial nuclear fuel will
have to be imported when the first two power reactors come
online in 2022. For nuclear non-proliferation activities, KSA
were committed to NPT in 1988, SQP in 2005, CSA in 2009,
and no AP has been concluded yet (see Table 1).
TABLE 1

2

SCOPE OF WORK

In this study, fuel cycle factors affecting transparency
were analyzed by quantifying the sensitive nuclear isotopes –
as defined under the IAEA’s safeguards – that will be produced within the prospective KSA nuclear facilities. Simulations assuming the deployment of light-water reactors were
performed using Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP6) code. The
goal of the simulations was to estimate the uranium fuel requirements and more importantly the amounts of sensitive
nuclear isotopes (primarily plutonium) produced in the deployment of the planned nuclear power program up through
2040. The results will help to reconcile the KSA’s current outlook toward higher nuclear transparency and the broader
safeguards conclusion. Additionally, the study discussed the
needed number of reactors in accordance to the KSA’s energy
demand. Such discussion would allow for an accurate identification of the needed number of reactors for the KSA’s civilian nuclear power program.

3

SPECIFICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED KSA CIVILAIN NUCLEAR POWER
PROGRAM

KSA
Nuclear Capacity

Parameter Specifications
Electricity Production
(GWe

Number of Nuclear
Power Reactors

17-18

16a

Name

Electricity Production (GWe)

Types of Power Reactors

EPR

1600

AP100

~1000

Options or Scenarios
Nuclear Fuel Cycle

1-Importation of the fuel
2-Manufacturing the fuel
3-A combination of both

Agreement Name

Signature or Ratification Date

NPT

1988

SQP

2005

CSA

2009

APc

-

IJSER
Nuclear NonProliferation
Activitiesb

DESCRIPTION OF WORK

3.1 THE KSA PROPOSED CIVILIAN NUCLEAR
POWER PROGRAM

KACARE has been involved in international agreements
to evaluate, roadmap, and strategize the deployment of the
KSA’s civilian nuclear power program [3]. Initially, KACARE
has projected the deployment of 16 power reactors to provide
at least 17-18 gigawatts-electric (GWe) by 2032-2040 (see Table
1) [3]. KACARE has not officially announced the deployment
of a specific type of power reactor, but both of the Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR) designed by AREVA (a French company) and the AP1000 designed by Westinghouse (a US company) has been proposed (see Table 1) [3]. Of all the reactor
types that the KSA has studied, the EPR is the most likely candidate. The Westinghouse AP1000 is unlikely to be deployed
in near future because KSA has not yet signed the 123 Agreement with United States of America [3]. In contrast, KSA
signed a nuclear agreement with France in 2011 and an
agreement with AREVA in 2015 to undertake a feasibility
study for building EPR [3]. Therefore, this study will assume
the deployment of EPR.
The first two power reactors are planned to begin operation by approximately 2022, followed by the subsequent addition of one or two reactors until the intended number of reactors are completed [3]. The KSA’s proposed nuclear fuel cycle
involves three options: 1) importing the nuclear fuel, which
does not require obtaining a local fuel fabrication and enrichment plants; 2) manufacturing nuclear fuel, which does require building local fuel fabrication and enrichment plants; or
3) a combination of the two options (see Table 1). The KSA

Source: World Nuclear Association. 2016. Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia [3].
a, The KSA’s number of reactors will be further discussed in section 4.1.
b, Non-Proliferation activities are limited, list does not include all conventions.
c, KSA has not yet signed the AP.

3.2 THE MAIN SPECIFICATION FOR EPR REACTOR

The EPR is a 3rd-generation pressurized water reactor designed by AREVA. Since 2003, EPRs have been considered by
China, Finland, and France for the production of electricity
[11]. The EPR offers ~1600 megawatts-electric (MWe) as electrical power, ~ 36% efficiency, and a 60-year plant lifetime
[11]. The main characteristics of the EPR core are described in
Table 2 [11], [12]. The EPR is designed to support advanced
fuel management [11], [12]. The AREVA fuel strategy covers
cycle lengths of 12, 18, and 24 months [12]. From a power
production perspective, a longer cycle means a better reactor
availability factor. Consequently, the 24-month cycle length
was considered in this study.
TABLE 2 THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EPR CORE
EPR Core Design
Number of Fuel Assemblies
Number of Fuel Rods per Fuel Assembly

241
265

Fuel Assembly Array

17x17

Number of Fuel Rods

89

Number of Guide Tubes per Assembly

24

Total Fuel Height (cm)

840

Active Fuel Height (cm)

420

Fuel Assembly Pitch (cm)

21.5
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Fuel Rod Pitch (cm)

1.26

Fuel Pin Diameter (cm)

0.95

Enrichment (%)

Up ro 5%-235U

Batch Discharge Burnup (MWD/Kg)

55 to 65

VA [11]. The composition of M5TM is not publicly released for
intellectual property reasons. According to the U.S. nuclear
regulatory commission (NRC), M5TM consists of 99% zirconium and 1% niobium [15].
TABLE 3 DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN MATERIALS OF EPR CORE

3.3 SPECIFICATION OF THE MCNP SIMULATION
MODEL

Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)
Material Name

Composition (weight %)a

In and Out-Diameter

0.16% C, 0.015% Si, 1.30% Mn,

243.5-268.5

(cm)

3.3.1

FUEL BURNUP

The 24-month cycle length (~720 days) was the adopted refueling scheme to allow for longer reactor availability. Therefore, The EPR loading pattern of the 24-month equilibrium
cycle is presented in Fig. 1. The equilibrium fuel cycle begins
with the third batch refueling cycles. The first batch of the fuel
cycle consisted of 241 fresh fuel assemblies at the beginning of
life (BOL). In the beginning of the second cycle, 112 fuel assemblies were discharged and replaced with 112 fresh fuel
assemblies. In the beginning of the third cycle (the equilibrium cycle), 112 of the remaining fuel assemblies from the BOL
were discharged and replaced with 112 fresh fuel assemblies.
At this point, the core consisted of 112 fresh fuel assemblies,
112 one-cycle old fuel assemblies and 17 two-cycle old fuel
assemblies (see Fig. 1). After fuel discharge, the decay of 241Pu
was accounted for. Due to its relatively short half-life (14.4 y),
changes in the 241Pu content of the discharged fuel are significant over the period of interest. The half-life is also small in
comparison with other significant plutonium isotopes. The
considered capacity factor is 90% along with 4500 megawattsthermal (MWt) as EPR thermal output.

16MND5

0.007% S, 0.010% P, 0.74% Ni,
0.18% Cr, 0.48% Mo, 0.06% Cu,
0.01% Co

Core Barrel
Material Name

Composition (weight %)b

In and Out-Diameter

304SS

0.05% C, 9.00% Ni, 18.00% Cr

205-210.175

Material Name

Composition (weight %)c

(cm)

Cladding and Guide Tube
In and Out-Diameter
(cm)
Cladding 0.4191-0.475
M5TM

99% Zr, 1% Nb

IJSER

Guide Tube 0.56660.6225

a, Source: steeldata.info. 2016. 16MND5 Steel [13].
b, Source: steeldata.info. 2016. 304 Stainless Steel [14].
c, Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).2011 [15].

4

DISCUSSION AND RESULTS

4.1 THE KSA’S ENERGY DEMAND VS. THE NEEDED
NUMBERS OF EPR UNITS
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Fig. 1. The EPR Loading Pattern with 24-Month Equilibrium
Cycle.

3.3.2 THE USED MATERIALS
The used materials in the MCNP simulation model for EPR
core are described in Table 3 along with their dimensions. The
reactor pressure vessel material is 16MND5. The core barrel
material is assumed to be 304 stainless steel (304SS), which is
the standard material that have been used in pressurized water reactor (PWR) [11], [13], [14]. For cladding and guide tube,
the material is M5TM which have been manufactured by ARE-

The goal of this section is to identify the needed number of
EPR reactors for KSA’s civilian nuclear power program. Such
identification is based on the KSA’s targeted nuclear capacity
which itself based on the projected growth of KSA’s electricity
demand. The KSA’s energy demand (electricity) is currently
rely on fossil fuels, specifically oil and natural gas plants [3],
[16], [17]. Due to the population growth and the need for
more desalination plants (desalinated water), the annual electricity demand is subjected to substantial increase [3], [16].
Many forecasts projected the annual increase in KSA’s energy
demand to range from 6 to 8 % [3].
As indicated by the World Nuclear Association (WNA),
KSA’s energy demand targeted a total of 128.5 GWe by 2032
[3]. The targeted KSA’s energy demand consist of 50 GWe by
solar and geothermal, 60.5 GWe by hydrocarbon (fossil), and
~18 GWe by nuclear [3]. The KACARE’s website stated the
same in regard of KSA’s targeted nuclear capacity (17.6 GWe
by 2032) [18]. In a previous work, analysis of KSA nuclear
program involving 16 EPR reactors was performed [19]. This
was in line with KSA project number of power reactors.
However, one unit of EPR is capable of producing 1.6 GWe
[11], and therefore, the needed numbers of EPR units would
be eleven. The KSA’s initial nuclear targeted data was 2032,
however, WNA stated that it has been put pack to 2040 [3].
Therefore, this study would consider both scenarios.
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4.1.1 THE ANALYZED SCENARIOS FOR
q

OPERATIONAL EPR
800

In compliance to the aforementioned information in regards of the KSA’s civilian power program, two scenarios
were analyzed. In scenario-I, two EPR reactors would be operational by 2022 and one EPR reactor would be subsequently
added each year until the 11 reactors had been deployed (see
Fig. 2). In scenario-II, two EPR reactors would be operational
by 2022 and one EPR reactor would be added each two years
(see Fig. 2). In both scenarios, the first equilibrium cycles
would be reached by 2028. With the implementation of scenario-I, the deployment of the 11 reactors would be complete
in 2031 and the last deployed reactor would reach the equilibrium cycle by 2037. With the implementation of scenario-II,
the deployment of the 11 reactors would be complete in 2040
and the last deployed reactor would reach its equilibrium cycle by 2046.
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(b)
Fig. 3. Uranium Requirements; (a) annual, and (b) cumulative.
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Fig. 2. The Analyzed Scenarios for 11 EPRs.

4.2 NUCLEAR FUEL REQUIREMENTS
In 2022, the KSA’s civilian nuclear power program will
require 254 tonnes of uranium (see Fig. 3. A) to feed the first
two reactors. Under the assumption of scenario-I, a similar
amount of uranium would be required each year until the
completion of the 11 reactors in 2031. Scenario-I would require 236 tonnes of uranium for refueling by 2031. Once all
the 11 reactors have been deployed, the annual uranium requirement will alternate between 354 tonnes and 295 tonens
starting from 2032, provided the number of reactors and the
refueling scheme remain the same. Scenario-I would require a
total of 5766 tonnes (cumulative) of uranium by 2040 (see Fig.
3. B). Under the implementation of scenario-II, the uranium
needed to fuel the reactors would peak at 717 tonnes in 2040,
at which time all the 11 reactors would have been deployed
(see Fig. 3. A). Scenario-II would require a total of 4585 tonnes
(cumulative) of uranium by 2040 (see Fig. 3. B).

From the nuclear fuel point of view, scenario-II seems to be
a better option for the KSA because of the lower rate of increase in the cumulative required uranium compared with
scenario-I (see Fig. 3. B). For the first ten years (2022-32), scenario-I and II would require 3168 and 2070 tonnes (cumulative) of uranium, respectively. In scenario-I, uranium would
be required each year either as fresh fuel or for refueling (see
Fig. 3. A). In contrast, scenario-II would not require uranium
each year (see Fig. 3. A) – the uranium requirement started at
2022 and the following year no uranium, triggering a biennial
uranium resource demand. Thus, scenario-II would allow for
better flexibility and lead time toward the KSA’s completion of
a robust strategy for safeguards and material accountability in
the planned nuclear facilities. From the perspective of electricity production, scenario-I is the better option because it would
provide the KSA targeted nuclear capacity (17.6 GWe by
2031). To this end, the KSA must evaluate both scenarios with
respect to its nuclear fuel requirements to determine the better
fit for the state.

4.3 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL IMPACT ON SAFEGUARDS
AND NONPROLIFERATION

Weapons-grade plutonium and reactor-grade plutonium
are both considered potential proliferation risks [20]. By 2024,
the cumulative discharged fuel (under the assumption of full
power at a 90% capacity factor) would contain 894 kg of plutonium for both scenarios (see Fig. 4). An approximately similar amount would be added each year under both scenarios if
the reactors were to be operated under the same conditions,
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0.840

0.007

0.820

0.006

0.800

Weight% 238 Pu/Pu

the state level of nuclear transparency will be limited to the
state’s declarations [21].

Weight% 239 Pu/Pu

0.005

0.780
0.004
0.760

239Pu/Pu Scenario-I
239Pu/Pu Scenario-II
238Pu/Pu Scenario-I
238Pu/Pu Scenario-II

0.740
0.720

0.003
0.002

2040

2038

2036

2034

2032

2030

2028

0.001

2026

0.700

2024

including the same refueling scheme. Thus, the plutonium
stock in both scenarios will continue to grow. By 2040, scenario-I would have yielded 21428 kg of plutonium, and 15986 kg
would have been produced in scenario-II (see Fig. 4). There is
no indication that the KSA will invest in nuclear fuel reprocessing. However, it is conceivable that the nuclear fuels may
be moved. Discharged fuels require cooling in the spent fuel
pools of the reactors for up to 5 years before any possible outside shipment, either for reprocessing or for transfer to a nuclear repository. Thus, the KSA must have a robust, comprehensive and complete strategy for safeguards and accountability in place well before any possible movement of discharged
fuels.
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Fig. 4. Annual Plutonium Production.
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Plutonium is regarded by the IAEA as a direct-use nuclear
material, of which 8 kg is sufficient to produce one nuclear
bomb [7]. However, 239Pu is the most suitable plutonium isotope for nuclear weapons [20]. The presence of 238Pu and 240Pu
in the plutonium vector is detrimental to the use of plutonium
in nuclear weapons [20]. The weight percentages of 238Pu,
239Pu, and 240Pu with respect to the total Pu for both scenarios
are presented in Fig. 5.
The weight fraction of 239Pu/Pu for both scenarios would
start at 0.71% and increase over time (see Fig. 5). By 2040, 81
percent of the plutonium will be 239Pu for both scenarios. By
contrast, the weight fraction of 238Pu/Pu for both scenarios
would start at 0.0064% and decrease over time (see Fig. 5. A.).
By 2040, the weight fraction of 238Pu/Pu for both scenarios
would have dropped to 0.0035%. The weight fraction of
240Pu/Pu for both scenarios would start at 0.171% and decrease over time (see Fig. 5. B.). By 2040, the weight fraction of
240Pu/Pu would have dropped to 0.129% for scenario-I and
0.131% for scenario-II.
The expected high quantities of plutonium consisting predominantly of 239Pu indicate the necessity to develop a robust
safeguards strategy towards; 1) high level of nuclear transparency, 2) broader safeguards conclusion. In addition, a robust
safeguards strategy will allow for; 1) raising the confident of
the international community, 2) attracting/securing nuclear
foreign cooperation, and 3) successful deployment of civilian
nuclear power program. The KSA have concluded reasonable
types of safeguards commitment/protocol such as the SQP in
2005 and the CSA in 2009 [3]. However, with these types of
safeguards commitment/protocol, the IAEA will not be able
to conclude that there is no indication of undeclared nuclear
activities in state [21]. With such types of safeguards commitment/protocol, the state’s safeguards conclusion as well as

(b)

Fig. 5. Plutonium Fractions for Both Scenarios; (a) 239Pu/Pu vs.
Pu/Pu, and (b) 239Pu/Pu vs. 240Pu/Pu.

238

The IAEA’s assessment to nuclear transparency in regards
of safeguards and nonproliferation, includes many factors
where the important one is the state compliance to the AP [10].
Therefore, in the case of KSA, further type of safeguards protocol that allow for broader access and information will be
needed. Given the KSA’s ambitious plan of nuclear power
program and the projected quantities of direct-use materials,
the KSA will need to foster its nuclear transparency. The fostering of such transparency can be achieved by agreeing to AP
compliance with the IAEA, which will enable the broader
safeguards conclusion and therefore raise the confident of the
international community.

5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

The goals of the described work were; 1) the estimation of
the required enriched uranium for fueling the proposed KSA
reactors – assuming the deployment of EPR, and 2) the quantification of the amounts of sensitive nuclear isotopes, primarily
plutonium, that will be stored in the proposed KSA reactors
after refueling. The reactor operations were simulated using
MCNP6. A two-year cycle length was assumed for the refueling strategy. For the deployment of the KSA reactors, two
scenarios were analyzed. In scenario-I, two reactors would be
deployed by 2022 and one reactors would be subsequently
added each year until the 11 reactors had been completed. In
scenario-II, two reactors would be operational by 2022 and one
reactor would be added each two years towards the completion of 11 reactors.
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The results indicated a total of 5766 tonnes of cumulative
uranium for scenario-I by 2040 and 4585 tonnes for scenario-II.
Scenario-II was suggested as a better option because of its
lower uranium requirements. The result indicated a total of
21.4 tonnes of plutonium (cumulative) for scenario-I by 2040,
81% of which would be 239Pu; for scenario-II, the corresponding total would be 15.9 tonnes, consisting of 81% 239Pu. For
both scenarios, adoption of the AP was therefore recommended as a first step in fostering transparency and enabling the
IAEA to conclude the broader safeguards conclusion. This
measure will raise the confidence of the international community and attract/secure foreign nuclear cooperation.
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SACM Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission
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